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DARE V.

BD. OF MEDICAL

EXAMINERS

[21 C.2d '

, review' of a; decision of an adminIstrative board 'autho#z~d
to adjudicate issues of fact arising in the application ,of a
valid statute. Had Dare questioned the validity of thestatu~e
and the board had ruled against him, he could ~hav,e had the
decision set aside by certiorari if the reviewing c~urt, cop,~'
eluded that the statute was invalid. Whateyer were the early,
'liniitations '1:0 England on the issues open on certiorari, the,
courts of thiR corintry long ago, held that on certiorari the reviewing court can set aside an administrative dC(iision based
upon anel'rorof law. (A leading case to this effect is Peop!e
V Smith, 45 N.Y., 772, de~ided in 1871; see GQodnow,op C$t., ,
6 Pol. S~i. Quart" 493.) That rule was embodied in section
462 of the Practice Act of 1851 and in section 1074 of the
Code of 'CivilProcedure of 1872 byth{provision thntthe revieWing court may , j determine, Vyhether ' the, inferior triht;lllal,
Board"()r, 6£ficer has ,regularly pursued,the authority of, such
tribunal, Board oroffiMr." Itsh9u1d also be observed that
if a board follows an unconstitutional Procedure, Qrfails to
follow a prpcedure prescribed by' statute, its decision may be
set aside on certiol'ari.
.
,
Tharecent decisions, requiring trial 4e D,OVO ofthe,:flndings
of administrative agencies exercising sta1ie~widep~:nyer' have
assumed that for various reasons it isunconstitutionaI in ,this
state to vesi"judicialfunctio~" in such agencies, ,'ailthis to·
a single result, the prevention of review of th~ir decision~ by
writ of certiorari. Do the functions of these agencies, cease 'to
be "judicial" when their" decislorisarel'Elviewable by the. majority's newiy qualified trial de novo?, Has not the maj9;rity
opinion by its very qualifica~ions of t~ial de, nbvo, d,escrlbed,
in the first part of this opinion, belied its own contention that
it' is unconstitutional to authorize such boards to make first
instance decisions on questions of law ,and issues of fact Y
I' concur in the judgment insofar as it holds that ~t was
proper for the trial court to deny the alt~rnative w;rit of
mandamus. I dissent, on the ground that Standard. 0$'7, Co. y,
State Board of Equalization,S1tpra, should be overruled and
that the present decision should be Without prejudice to the
right of the petitioner to apply for certiorari.
4

Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
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NORMAN RUSSELL, Respondent, v. ALLEN MlLL,ER; ~~:
Registrar' of Contractors, etc., et, aI., Kppellmtts. -. ,,'
>

[1] Administrative

,"

taW,.,.;.Mand.lun:u~'l'l1a1De NC)Y~:BVi~on~

Record, of Evidence"';';In a m:IiJid!t~li$,-'):id~.edpjf,t({ ~ie~'
, the' s;ction' ,of thedonti'li~tor;s::~tate:;Li~e,~s,~',~~4i,dt_Jj{'8iror'
to strikilthe record of th~, oral eyideri¢~ befcitlf the .board:
which had, been int-roduc~d il.l eVid¢:ilce., " '",
[2] td.-Mandalnugo,..,.Appeal"",":HarlAles8and;e.e~er,8ible Erroi'~
"Strilting' Evidence.-::!IIi"a Wqp.dailiU;~' 'Pr~eeditig, ~Q/';Mli" the;
evidence of i:J.n tidministrattveJ)oi:J.rd; erro(in 'stI.;J~ibg'tbe :tee.:-:
ordof' oral evidence , before Jhe ,bQardwas hl1~leB~ )vhero:
evidence 'intioduced' 'as in,', an- u~liInitea trial ;£e 'nQvo' sUP:".
ported '~he" findings im4.j'~q~~J;lt,a~d ihis, 'd~spit~,thet~~~~
that the petitionerls teatrmpny before the board ",as mQro
detailed, than in the' trial court. '
.
' ,'

APPEAL ,from a judgment of the, SuperiOr Court otthe'
bity: gnd doun,ty of San Fl'anclsco.F~ank T: Deasy, Jlldg~.:
Affir:Io:ed.
.
P1:o~~edingmIllandamus 'to require' the' nonenforcement of ,"
the. re'Vocati!:lnofa contractor's license' 'and the disfui.iiS8.l Qf.
the dis(lipliriarYIlroceeding~ Judgmerit directing restcltation'
,of license' affirmed.

Earl Warren, Attorney General, Lucas E. Kilkenny,' J. AI-,
bert Hutchinson and Allen Martin, Deputies Attorney General, for Appellants.
Geary, & Geary, C. J. Tauzer, Bradford M. Melvin, Darwin' Bryan and Charles J: Wiseman for ,Respondent.
SHENK, J .......The petitioner filEld" in, the sllp~:n.~r eou::rt a'
petition for' a writ of ,mandAte directmg ',the,: respondents,
ContrMtots' State License J30ard, its members ~d itsr~gfs~,
trar, to ref:rainfromenfol'~ing t:qere'Vocation' otth~, petition.
er ~~ license ',ElS, an electric'al '~(jritractOr,,' and' to disbtiss the
complaintperiding before the board. The respondentS have,'

t1] See 42 Am;Jur. 662.
"
,'
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Administrative Law.
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appealed from a judgment which directed them to restore
the petitioner's license.
The petitioner was :charged by the registrar of the board,
with certain violations of the terms ofa contract for the
reconstruction and aIieration of the Napa High School Building; one of which was that the work was to be in strict compliance with the Electrical Safety Orders of the' Industrial
Accident Commission, ,the National Electrical Code,and any
and aU ordinances, rules and regulations of the city and
county in which the work was tobe performed. Eleven violati.ons of the, National Electric Code and Electrical Safety
Orders and nineteen alleged material and wilful deviations
from the plans and specifications were specified. The petitioner filed an answer and a hearing was had, whereupon
it was. found by the board that the evidence showed the violations as charged. By an· administrative order dated Febrllary 19, 1Q40, the petitioner's license was suspended until,
February 19, 1941, "and until defendant makes restitution
to the Board of Trustees of the Napa Union High School
satisfactory to the Registrar of Contractors," with. a provision. expressly preserving existing contracts.. A stay ofexe~
cution was denied by the board because of the last mentioned
provision.
The petition for the writ showing' the foregoing facts was
filed on March 9, 1940. The petitioner challenged .the jurisdiction ·of the board, pleaded the statute of 'limitations; and
the insufficiency of. the evidence to sustain the administrative
findings and conclusion. An alternative writ was issued and
as a return thereto an .answer to-the petition was filed. The
tdal 'court found that there had· been certain violations of
the safety orders, but that with one exception they had occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint, before the board and were therefore barred (sec. 7091
Bus. & Pro~. Code) ; that in the excepted instance and in the
cases of other expressly found departures from the plans and
specifications, the violil.~ions constituted neither wilful departures from nor disregard of the plans or specifications in
any material respect; that they were not prejudicial and were
not without the appropriate consent of authorized persons.
,The trial court conCluded that the petitioner was entitled
to the restoration of his license and rendered judgment direct-ingthe issl.1ance of the peremptory writ;
. [1] . On the appeal the respondents contend that the trial
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, court cOnimitte.d prejudicial error in' ruling t9-afa pOl'tioll.
the record of the evidence before the board was not a Proper'
matter for cOI1sideration of the court in the man:d~Diuspro
ceeding; and in striking that portion of the record frorii,the
evidence before it.
At tha commencement of the tri~ the petitioner,st~ted
that he desired to offer the record oftha proce.ea,mgs,meludIng theol;'al and docum~ntary evidence, taken "before the
board. The respondents made available a certified, copy, o~
the record for that pUI'pose.. It was introduced' in, evi~enrie
by the 'attorney for the respondents at the ,openillgof the
second'trial day without any objection o.n the. part of the
petitiorter~. The trial court. adopted that procedti~eas.being
inconformity with the decision' of this court' in. Drummeip
Y • .state Board of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75 ,[87 P.2d
848] . On the third and last day of the' trial, the petition~r
attetp.pted. to withdraw the record' taken before the board from
.' the consideration of the court and moved to strike it from
the evidence on the ground that under the dec4MI:1of the
Oistrict Court of Appeal shortly theretofore rendered in the
. case of Laisne v. State Board of. Optometry, • (Cal.App.)
'r101 P~2d 787] ,he was entitled to a complet'e, anduti~
limited trial' de novo. Over the respondents' obje_~tion th,e
trial court granted the motion as to the transcript of ;()r~l
evidence, but denied it as to the record of the contracts, exhibits, pleadings and the board's findings and decision. The
findings and conclusion of the trial court were therefore based
on the evidence introduced on the mandanlUs h~arm:g btit
independently Of the record of the oral. evidence beforeth,e
board...
. . '
. The ruling of the trial court in so striking the· record of
the oral evidence was erroneous under the decision, of this .
cou.rt in the case of Dare· v. Board of Medical Examiners
(ante 1 P. 790 [136 P.2d 304]), this day filed. 'iIi that
case it waS decided' that the petitioner. in the mandamus pro~
ceeding was not entitled to an unlimited tr~al den~v:o; that
a consideration of the record of .the pl'Qceedingsbefore '.the
board was essential to a proper determinitiOnof· the ques-

'*Rep~~te~'s note:, A hearing was granted h;r the Supreme CouiTt
in the case .of Lais.ne v. State Board on June 17, 1940.,: ~he,opin
Ion of the Supreme Court is reported in 19 Cal.2d 831 [123 P.2d ,
457].

'.
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.tion of th~ board's official duty in the premises, and that sajd
, record was competent evidf;lnce in the mandamus proceeding
of . such matters as were properly admissible·· as evidence
Qefore the board.
.
[2] . Notwith~tanding the errol' of the trial court in the
pres~rit case in granting the motion to ~rike fl,"omtlle record
~h~. transcript of the oral. evidence taken before ·theboaz:d,
l~ 1$ cleart~at the ruling did not result iIi. prejudice to the
rlghts.of. th~ appellan:ts~ Both the petitioner and' the.~ppel
lants Int:rod:u~e~ e~idence in the ttialcourt independent
,of the admInIstratIve recOrd,hut conce~g matters ,con~
tai~ed !n tIre .stricken :record cif oral' eyiaehCe; anQ each' side '
, rested. Its, cas:e o~ s~ch ,~vidence., The" trial court" exp,ressly
,anhounce.d that ItS ~ondttct oftheh~aring~as a "trial de
novo," and that its decision would. be: rendered on, the evi.
:df;lnc,e then before itex~lttS.~ve of the. recbrd Ofol'alevidence
,be~ore the board, unless ,~here wa.s further evidence to be prefsente~. .No fl!rther eVidence was presented. Theappellartts
,.b.ase~e,lr c~aIm ofptejlldice on the. ~ssertio,n that the:pet~
.tlOner s testunony before· the, board· w8sl1I,ateriill. to the "isshes
Ilnd "':~s there giveninln0l'e detail than in the trial court,
l1~dthatthey w,~re .dep:('ive,d of the (lPMrturiity to prO<lll~e
, WI~tl(l$Se,S ,to t~tifY '. t~ the facts, cogtaiI1e<l in the tratl~cdpt
of .:t;b.'~ oral. eYlgence. Exa~inatiol:l' of the, record disc!o$Els
·th~t. th~ ,tri~ ~ourt ~Vited tlte introductiC)I1 of. anYe~den.ce
,as In,an UIil~ted tr1l11 de novo. Th'Q,t evidenc~ wa;s presented
and as sOl'ecel;ve~supPOrtsthefuidings an!! jUdgfnent~ The
tact ,thll.t,. ~e testI~Q~~ . o~ bep.a~f. of. t~e pet,itio.~,~rmay:have
,~een more 1Jl d.etall,on th~ ,admlDlstl'atiye heai'ing wotad not
'~om:pel 0; JttS~~ _the ,con<ll~ion . that !fe ~vid¢nce actually
,rccerve~ :u;t court was lDsUffiment as such support.
,The Judgment is affirmed.
Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Griffin, J. pro tem., ~o~curred.
TRAYNOR, J.-'-I dissent.
, In this Case the majority opinion gives no heed to the statutory pr~'\Tisions for judi~i~ review. Sections 7090-7098 of
the BUfjIness and Professions 'Code authorize the Registrar
of ~ontractors _to suspeng.· the license of a contractor for
speCIfied misconduct, .after ,notice and a hearing of "all rele':a.Dt and competent evid<"nce material to the issues." Section 7099 provides. that any~ecision of the Registrar "shall
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be 'subject to review by the s.uperior c6urt" forwliieJi' the
party ~ay "file pis petition," but is silent,:as to thes,c9pe .Qf
such .review. It' is riot identified as c~rtior8.ri,· mandamus"
ortttlY otherstaridardprocedure set .forth' inth~· Ogd~ ~of
CivitProce'dure.Had the petitioner followed the'statUtory "
language be would have fi1ed a petitionforteyJ.ew,iri ,thO
superior,cpurt. It would nbt beunreasQD.able to ·infei: :tliat
the Legislature intepded a complete retrial in tM;~p¢()r
court; the reference in section 7101 to '! II; judgment' of iSU~.,
'pension, 01' cancellation of, license b1 tM S11P~rio~ :<@tii"t ':"S~~.
to impl~ an independentjudgr;nent. Hadcettiol'a.n~e'riew
been lntended, one wouid look fora diffel'ent.::"tennib01ogy,
suc,h as" !letting aside or affirnrlng" the ~de,cis:totl)f.· th~:)~egis~.
tl,"ar. ''nUs court, ,however,lllightlfave followed, the' T~~/ls
case;$" ,relied upon in the majority oplnio1).in',z)arILv.B~~t'4
of Medical Examiners, ante, p.790 [136P.2d,304];':and
arrived at the conclusion that theLegislatu~~did pot ~ean:
trial de novo. There should at least hav~.beell" an' inqu~ry, ..
Into the scope of the review int~nded by the;~¢.Sla.~!r' "
If the majority opinion exemplifies th~. newmtexn ,of trial
den,ovo in mandamus proceedings it is ,at the.oPPPI3ite'·pole
from Dare v~ Board of Medical Ej;aminers.Noto,nlywalilthe
tr'8nscript 6f oral evidence befo:re the boardst!'#cl(,f:totri tlio
record, but 'the evidence before the boa,rd .waS~¢,it~ra~¢diIi
the trial court, contrary to the principles in .the .maJ(1rity
opin$on in the Dare case and without'regfl.rg for th~~~,s
set forth in that opinion regarding the adn;ti~iQli of new
eVidence. There is no clue as to whatwou).d 'co~itute an
abuse of discretion. So much latitude has been given the
trial, court as to suggest that the' problem whether a pctitioner should be accorded a trial de novo or a review'with the
Scope of a certiorari review is in effect shifted to the superior
courts.
Gibson, C. J., and

Edmon~,

J." concurred. '

